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The Constitution1 refers to reproductive rights in two sections: sec-
tion 27(1)(a) provides that everyone has the right of ‘access to health 
care services, including reproductive health care’, while section 
12(2)(a) states that everyone has the right to ‘bodily and psycho-
logical integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concern-
ing reproduction’. At the same time, the Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to ‘freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion’.2 What happens when these rights conflict?
Given that the health care services required by section 27(1)
(a) are generally provided by state hospitals  employing state doc-
tors, and that the right referred to in section 12(2)(a) is now ac-
commodated by the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act3 (the 
Choice Act), what is the position of state-employed doctors who 
refuse to participate in terminations of pregnancy on the grounds 
of conscience? What are their legal and ethical duties? Is there 
freedom of conscience for state doctors under the Choice Act? 
Does freedom of conscience extend to preventing or obstructing 
terminations of pregnancy under the Act? Does freedom of con-
science extend to refusing to give information about the Act?
Ethical and legal duties of state 
doctors
As a general rule, medical practitioners are not required to treat 
every patient who consults them unless there is an emergency,4 
they are bound by contract,5 or there is a statutory duty to treat 
such persons.6 However, state hospitals are bound by statute to 
render medical care to patients who qualify for such care,7 and 
state-employed health practitioners are contractually bound to 
render services to such patients on behalf of hospitals employing 
them.5 In this respect, state doctors and health care practitioners 
can be likened to persons exercising a public calling, where liabil-
ity is imposed in delict for failing to carry out such calling.8 Unlike 
private practitioners, state-employed practitioners cannot pick and 
choose their patients.
Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution now strengthens the right 
of public patients who cannot afford private medical services to 
demand ‘reproductive health care’ at the expense of the state, 
provided that it is ‘within its available resources’.9 It is submitted, 
however, that while the latter includes both financial and human 
resources, it would be untenable if at an otherwise adequately 
staffed state hospital, terminations of pregnancy were not done 
because the medical personnel were not prepared to participate 
in lawful abortions on the grounds of conscience.9 In such circum-
stances, there may well be a legal duty on the state to ensure that 
it employs health care practitioners who are prepared to partici-
pate in terminations of pregnancy at all state hospitals.
It is submitted that in emergency cases, where there is a se-
vere risk to the patient’s life or the danger of grave illness, any doc-
tor, whether state-employed or not, is morally, ethically and legally 
bound to render medical assistance to eliminate the cause of such 
risk or illness. This emergency principle extends to persons who 
are not patients of the doctor at the time the need arises. Although 
it is said that there is generally no liability for a mere omission 
in South African law, where the legal convictions of the commu-
nity would regard the failure to act as unlawful, liability will be im-
posed.10 It is submitted that the legal convictions of the community 
would be outraged if doctors were to fail to render assistance dur-
ing medical emergencies because of their conscience. 
In the light of the above, it could be argued that where a medi-
cal emergency is caused by pregnancy, there is a moral, ethical 
and legal duty on the doctor concerned to terminate the pregnan-
cy, provided of course that it can be done safely and in accordance 
with good medical practice. In England, such a duty is imposed by 
statute.11 The Choice Act in South Africa allows for terminations 
of pregnancy in emergency cases to be done even after the 20th 
week of pregnancy, e.g. where the continued pregnancy would en-
danger the woman’s life.12 Furthermore, the Constitution provides 
that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment.4 
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The original version of this article was published as David J Mc-
Quoid-Mason. State doctors, freedom of conscience and ter-
mination of pregnancy. The Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law Journal of Southern Africa 1997;1(6):15-17, which ceased 
publication the same year.
Freedom of conscience and the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Act
The Choice Act makes no mention of a conscience clause, unlike 
the Abortion and Sterilization Act,13 which provided that persons, 
other than the authorising medical superintendent, who had con-
scientious objections against abortion need not participate in the 
operation.14 This is because, before enactment of the Constitution, 
a failure to mention a conscience clause in the Abortion and Sterili-
zation Act would have meant that health care personnel would not 
have had such a right. As freedom of conscience is mentioned in 
the Constitution1 it was not necessary to mention it in the Choice 
Act because all laws and enactments of the legislature are bound 
by the Bill of Rights.15 Therefore the Choice Act must be read to-
gether with the Bill of Rights as allowing doctors some measure 
of freedom of conscience. The question in the case of state-em-
ployed doctors is: how much?
Our courts can seek some guidance from the English medi-
cal profession concerning how the issue of conscientious objec-
tion is handled. England now has a Human Rights Act16  based 
on the European Convention on Human Rights,17 but also has a 
conscientious objection clause in its Abortion Act.18 Despite the 
conscience clause, there is a duty to participate in an abortion op-
eration that is necessary to save life or prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of pregnant women.11 It has 
been suggested that in non-emergency cases the medical prac-
titioner is under a duty to refer the patient to another practitioner 
who is willing to carry out the procedure.19 Failure to refer a patient 
who subsequently suffers damage as a result of not having her 
pregnancy terminated is likely to result in legal liability, and it will 
be no defence for a doctor to argue that he or she was acting out 
of conscience.20 Likewise, the British Medical Association takes 
the view that failure to refer a patient to another doctor who is 
prepared to terminate a pregnancy could give rise to legal liability 
if a delay or refusal results in an inability to obtain a termination.21 
These principles apply to all doctors and nursing staff.22
It is submitted that, in South African law, similar principles ap-
ply to both state and private doctors. In the case of a pregnancy 
being life-threatening or likely to cause severe injury to the health 
of the woman, there will be a duty on any available doctor to termi-
nate the pregnancy. In such circumstances, any doctor who does 
not wish to participate in an abortion on grounds of conscience 
may only refuse to treat if there is another doctor who is able to 
do the procedure. If not, the only available doctor will have to car-
ry out the emergency pregnancy termination against his or her 
conscience or face the legal consequences of failure to do so. 
Conscientious objection will not be a good defence in emergency 
situations.
In non-emergency cases, doctors who wish to exercise their 
right of conscientious objection must refer the patient to a doc-
tor who is prepared to terminate the pregnancy. This is consistent 
with the Declaration of Oslo,23 which states: ‘If a physician consid-
ers that his convictions do not allow him to advise or perform an 
abortion, he may withdraw while ensuring the continuity of medical 
care by a qualified colleague’.24 It could also be argued that in 
some instances failure to refer a patient on conscientious grounds 
can be construed as trying to force a particular religious belief on 
the patient, which is contrary to the Declaration of Geneva25 and 
which updated the original Hippocratic Oath that outlawed abor-
tion.26 For instance, it has been said that the right to freedom of 
religion, thought, belief and opinion protects the moral autonomy 
of persons and groups, and that ‘when a state prohibits abortion 
it dictates the morality which should govern women’s decisions 
concerning pregnancy and childbearing’.27
Freedom of conscience and 
preventing or obstructing of access 
to termination of pregnancy under 
the Choice Act
The requirement of referral to a medical practitioner prepared to 
do an abortion in non-emergency cases is further strengthened by 
the provision in the Choice Act that makes it an offence if any per-
son ‘prevents the lawful termination of a pregnancy or obstructs 
access to a facility for the termination of a pregnancy’.28 It could be 
argued that a doctor who refuses or omits to refer a patient to an-
other doctor who is prepared to terminate the pregnancy lawfully, 
or to a facility where such termination may be done, is prevent-
ing the lawful termination of pregnancy or obstructing access to a 
facility for the termination of pregnancy. This interpretation of the 
need to refer could be considered as an infringement of a pro-life 
doctor’s freedom of conscience because he or she may regard the 
act of referral as tantamount to being an accessory to murder.29 
Can such infringements be justified in terms of the Constitution?30
The limitation clause of the Constitution provides that a right 
may be limited in terms of a law of general application to the ex-
tent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. When considering whether the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable the following factors must be taken into 
account: (i) the nature of the right; (ii) how important it is to limit the 
right; (iii) the nature of the limitation and its extent; (iv) the relation-
ship between the limitation and its purpose; and (v) whether there 
are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.30 
The provisions in the Choice Act regarding the obstruction of 
prevention of access to a termination of pregnancy are of gen-
eral application because they apply to any person who prevents or 
obstructs an abortion.28 The question arises whether these provi-
sions may be regarded as reasonable and justifiable in terms of 
the limitation clause. It is submitted that they may, for the following 
reasons: (i) the nature of the right to freedom of conscience is such 
that it cannot be regarded as absolute in relation to the medical 
profession, particularly in cases of emergency and where doctors 
are state-employed; (ii) the limitation has a sufficiently important 
purpose because it ensures that women who wish to exercise their 
constitutional31 and legal rights32 concerning their reproductive ca-
pacity are not prevented or obstructed from doing so; (iii) the na-
ture and extent of the limitation is such that it is not over-broad be-
cause it only refers to preventing lawful terminations of pregnancy 
or obstructing access to facilities for terminating pregnancies,33 
and does not compel doctors in non-emergency cases to partici-
pate actively in abortion operations; (iv) the limitation is rationally 
connected to the purpose of enabling women who qualify to exer-
cise their constitutional and legal rights to procure a legal abortion 
without being prevented or obstructed from doing so; and (v) the 
limitation restricts freedom of conscience as little as possible in 
that it can be interpreted to mean that doctors are only obliged to 
procure abortions in cases of emergency or where no other doc-
76         December 2010, Vol. 3, No. 2  SAJBL
    Article
tor is available – in all other cases, they merely have to refer the 
patient to a practitioner who is prepared to do the procedure.
Freedom of conscience and the duty 
to give information on termination 
of pregnancy in terms of the Choice 
Act
The Choice Act provides that a woman who requests an abortion 
from a medical practitioner or registered midwife ‘shall be informed 
of her rights under [the] Act by the person concerned’.33 This provi-
sion creates a new statutory duty, and the question arises whether 
this is an infringement of a doctor’s (or midwife’s) right to freedom of 
conscience. It is submitted that although technically it may be such 
an infringement for similar reasons to those set out above, such a 
limitation is justifiable. The fact that a doctor, opposed to abortion 
on grounds of conscience, is obliged to give a woman information 
about a statute that enables her to exercise her constitutional and 
statutory rights, should generally be regarded as reasonable and 
justifiable in open and democratic societies based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom – particularly if the doctor is state-employed. 
The limitation on the right to freedom of conscience is reasonable 
and justified because: (i) as previously mentioned, the right to free-
dom of conscience cannot be regarded as absolute in respect of 
doctors (and midwives); (ii) the limitation has a sufficiently important 
purpose because if women do not know what their rights are under 
the Act they will not be able to exercise their constitutional and legal 
rights; (iii) the nature and extent of the limitation is such that it is 
not over-broad because it only refers to the provision of information 
about women’s rights under the Act; (iv) the limitation is rationally 
connected to the purpose of ensuring that women who qualify for a 
termination of pregnancy under the Act are informed of their rights; 
and (v) the limitation restricts freedom of conscience as little as pos-
sible because doctors (and midwives) are not required to participate 
in the abortion operation itself but merely to explain to the patient 
what her rights are under the Act.
In England, the Abortion Act34 states that, as a general rule, doctors 
may refuse to ‘participate in any treatment’ to which they have a consci-
entious objection,35 and this has been held to mean participation in the 
medical or surgical process itself, and not the mere typing of a letter of 
referral to another doctor willing to do an abortion.36 It has therefore been 
suggested that, while doctors may refuse to treat in non-emergency 
cases, they remain under a duty to advise, for example by referring the 
patient to another doctor prepared to terminate the pregnancy.22 
The South African Choice Act goes further than the English 
Act by requiring the doctor (or midwife) consulted to inform the 
woman about her rights under the Choice Act. If the English ap-
proach were followed in South Africa, it could be argued that the 
provision is not an infringement of the freedom of conscience pro-
vision because it does not require doctors to become involved in 
the medical or surgical procedures regarding the abortion. In such 
a case, it would not be necessary to conduct an enquiry in terms 
of the limitation clause.
Conclusion
The following conclusions may be drawn from the above:
•    There is a conflict in the South African Bill of Rights between 
the rights of women to reproductive health care and to make 
decisions about their reproductive capacity, and freedom of 
conscience on the part of the medical profession.
•    State-employed doctors, unlike private practitioners, cannot 
pick and choose their patients.
•    In emergency cases where there is a risk to the patient’s life or 
danger of grave illness, all doctors have a legal duty to render 
assistance to eliminate such risk or illness, and the same ap-
plies where the risk or danger arises from pregnancy.
•    During an emergency, a doctor may only refuse to participate in 
a termination of pregnancy on grounds of conscience if there is 
another doctor available to do the procedure.
•    In non-emergency cases, doctors wishing to exercise freedom 
of conscience must refer patients to another doctor who is pre-
pared to terminate the pregnancy – failure to do so may be 
construed as preventing or obstructing access to termination of 
pregnancy under the Choice Act.
•    The provisions of the Choice Act dealing with preventing or 
obstructing terminations of pregnancy, or requiring doctors to 
give pregnant women information about their rights under the 
Act, may be construed as infringing their right to freedom of 
conscience, but are likely to be justified under the limitation pro-
visions of the Constitution.
•    If the English law approach is followed, doctors may not use 
freedom of conscience to refuse to give advice or refer a patient 
to another doctor because such conduct cannot be construed 
as participating in an abortion operation. 
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